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Amongthedifferent kinds of economic behavior which mayaccountfor
the familiar Fisherian relationship between nominal interest rates andex—
pected price inflation, portfolio behavior is the most plausibly flexible
in the short run. Since substitution into real assets is nota practical
portfolio alternative for many investors, however, it is not obvious a priori
how important lenders' portfolio behavior can be inbringing about the adjust-
ment of interest rates which Fisher's theory associates withexpected infla-
tion. Given the importance of this adjustment forquestions of both monetary
theoryand monetary policy, the underlying economic behavior meritsexplicit
investigation.
The empirical results presented in this paper provide evidencethat
lenders' portfolio behavior does play an important role in theexpected-price-
inflation/nomjnal-jnterest..rate relationship. First, results indicatethat
five of the six major categories of investors in theU.S. long—term bond
market reduce their demands for bonds inresponse to an increase in expected
inflation. Secondly, the results of multi—equationpartial—equilibri ex-
periments indicate that ,with all other things unchanged, thisresponse by
investors will raise the equilibrium nominal bondyield by about 2/3% in
response to a 1% increase in expected inflation.Revised
January, 1978
PRICE INFLATION, PORTFOLIOCHOICE, AND NOMINAL INTEREST RATES
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Thebelief that expectations offuture price inflation tend to result
in higher nominalinterest rates ——theproposition which Irving Fisher, in a
perhaps more optimistic era, labeled"preciation andinterest"1——isnow
conunonpi.ace among botheconomistsandfinancialmarket participants. The rise
of nominal interestrates in theUnited States to record high levelsin 1974,
justwhen the U.S. economy was
undergoing its first experience of peacetime
double-digit inflation, dramaticallydemonstrated this relationship ateven
the most unsophisticated
eyeball level. Many economists havealso undertaken
statistical investigations of this
relationship, using a variety of devicesto
obviate the analytical difficultiesdue to the unobservability ofthe relevant
expectations.2 With itsinunediate implications for realyields, the Fisher
relationship is central to the classic
questions confronting monetarytheory
and policy.
Many importantaspects of the
rate relationship remainundetermined, however. In thecomparative statics
contextof a long-run steady-stateequi1jbrj, do nominal yields adjuston a
one-for-one basis with fullyanticipated inflation, therebyleaving real
yields unaffected? In the dynamiccontext ofa transition from one suchequi-
librjumto another, arethe lags associated withexpectation formation (which
Fisheremphasized) the only reason why nominalyields mayadjustslowly toward
theirnew steady—state values?Alternatively, to what extent are otherlags
involved,arising either from limitedspeeds of portfolio adjustment outof—2—
equilibriumor from gradual changes in saving and investment behavior? At the
most fundamental level, what is the exact nature of the process by which
economic behavior causes nominal interest rates to respond to price expecta-
tions in the specified way? Fisher himself was curiously sketchy in his
"interpretation" of the relationship,3 and most subsequent writers on the sub-
ject have followed his lead in seeking more to document and quantify the
relationship than to investigate in any precise way the underlying economic
behavior which causes it.
The object of this paper is to explore in some detail one of the possible
sources of the Fisher relationship —-inparticular, the portfolio behavior of
lenders. The starting point for this analysis is the simple truism that, for
expectations of price inflation to affect interest rates, they must affect the
behaviorof lenders or borrowers (or both). Responses to such expectations on
thepart of lenders and borrowers could logically involve not only their port-
folio behavior (the composition of their assets held and liabilities issued)
but also their saving and investment behavior (the amounts of their assets
held and liabilities issued). This paper's specific focus is on the role of
lenders' portfolio behavior in the relationship between price expectations and
nominal interest rates, and the paper investigates this role using behavioral
equations directly explaining lenders' willingness to enter into long-term
fixed—income loan contracts.4 To anticipate, the conclusion of the paper's
partial—equilibrium analysis is that lenders' portfolio behavior is an important
component of the economic process generating the Fisher relationship. Results
based on U.S. data indicate that, with all other aspects of economic behavior
held unchanged, lenders' portfolio behavior would cause the equilibrium level
of nominal bond yields to rise by 0.65% for each 1% of expected price inflation.—3—
Section I discusses several different hypotheses about economicbehavior
which would logically support Fisher's relationshipbetween price expectations
and nominalinterest rates, andexplains the particularly interesting features
ofthosewhich turn on portfolio behavior. Section IIdevelops the key
behavioral equations describing lenders' demand forlong-term fixed-interest
loans,andSection III presents estimation results for theseequations based
onU.S. data for six majorcategoriesof lenders. Section IV presents partial-
equilibrium simulation results showing the implications of lenders'portfolio
behavior, as represented by these estimated equations, for therelationship
betweenexpected price inflation andnominalyields. Section V briefly sum-
marizesthe paper's conclusions.—4—
I. Portfolio Behavior and the Fisher Relationship
Since there is widespread agreement not only on the importance of expected
real yields in influencing economic activity but also on the ability of monetary
policy to cause price inflation, the equilibrium extent and the dynamic speed of
the adjustment of nominal interest rates to expected inflation are crucial
determinantsof the ability of monetary policy toinfluence economic activity
in the longand shortruns, respectively. The great concern which economists
haveshown with the expected—price-inflation/nominal-interest-rate relationship
istherefore hardly surprising.
Fisher assumed that, in long-run steady-state equilibrium, nominal yields
adjust on a one—for—one basis with expected price inflation, thereby leaving
real yields (and hence real economic activity) invariant to fully anticipated
inflation. By contrast, Mundell (50] and Tobin [69] have argued --instatic
and dynamic models, respectively —-that,given the fixed nominal yield
(conventionally zero) on money balances, the inevitable reduction in the real
yield on money which is consequent upon price inflation will cause a correspond-
ing reduction in real yields on other assets. According to the Mundell-Tobin
view, therefore, nominal yields will adjust less than one—for—one with expected
inflation, and real economic activity will itself depend on the rate of
inflation. ?.bre recently, Darby [9] and Feldstein [13] have conversely argued
that the distortion introduced by price inflation under non-indexed taxation
will cause the adjustment of nominal yields to be greater than one-for-one. The
precise equilibrium nature of the Fisher relationship --andwith it the equilib-
rium effectiveness of monetary policy ——istherefore an open question.
Evenifnominal yields do adjust fully for expected inflation in long-run
steady—state equilibrium, there remains the question of the short-run effective-
ness of monetary policy if the adjusthent is not instantaneous. Fisher relied—5-.
largelyon lags in (autoregressive) expectation formation to explain the
observed lag of nominal interest rate movements behind actual price movements,
but --insharp contrast to the typical modernrenderingof his views --hedid
not assume either that real yields are constant (or constant to a white noise),
or that they remain invariant to price inflation in the short run.5 In addition,
at least in his early work Fisher argued that, in the short run, asymmetrical
behavior between lenders and borrowers further rendered real yields systematically
dependent on the rate of price inflation.6 The well documented lags associated
with a number of relevant aspects of economic behavior, including construction
and delivery times for physical investment and the transactions costs of port-
folio adjustment, provide yet additional potential sources of a lagged relation-
ship and further suggest that even fully anticipated price inflation may influence
real yields —-and,consequently, that monetary policy may influence real
economic activity ——inthe short run.
Many economists have investigated these important questions by working
directly with the relationship between nominal interest rates and price expec-
tations.7 It is clear, however, that this relationship is at best (if price
expectations are meaningfully exogenous) a reduced-form relationship which
presumably follows from --butdoes not explicitly reveal --someunderlying
behavioral structure.8 In the more general case without the exogeneity
assumptionfor price expectations, the Fisher relationship is a connection
between twoendogenousvariables within a structural model.
Inattemptingtoshedlight on thequestionsposed above about the
equilibrium extent and dynamic speed of Fisher's adjustment of nominal interest
rates to expected price inflation, therefore, itisuseful first to identify
the specific kinds of individual optimizing behavior which mayplausibly—6—
produce the observed adjustment. Nominal interest rates are relative prices
set on loan agreements struck between lenders and borrowers. Since these
nominal yields (or, conversely, prices of loan agreements) are proximately
determined in a market in which loans are extended and received, it is a
truism that any factor hypothesized to influence such yields (prices) must do
so by influencing some lender's demand for loans, or some borrower's supply
9
of loans, or both.For expectations of future price inflation to increase
nominal interest rates, therefore, the behavioral process by which they do so
must involve creating a net excess supply of loans by reducing lenders'
willingness to lend and/or increasing borrowers' willingness to borrow at a
given nominal yield.
In what way may price expectations have this effect? Two broad groups of
hypotheses, both based on the appealing assumption that it is the expected
utility of real wealth which matters for economic behavior, are able to provide
some explanation.
First, saving and investment behavior may plausibly be responsive to
anticipated real yields. From the standpoint of lenders, the simplest example
is a household which decides to consume more and save less, ata given nominal
interest rate, when expectations •of price inflation shift the perceived inter-
temporal consumption possibility frontier infavor of current consumption.
Hence the demand for total portfolio wealth in general, and for loans inpartic-
ular, is smaller. From the standpoint of borrowers, the analogous example isa
firm which decides to do more loan—financed investment, at a given nominal
interest rate, when expectations of price inflation increase theexpected
revenue stream from sales of future output. Hence the supply of loans is
greater. In either case the resulting net excess supply of loans means that
the nominal interest rate must rise to clear the loan market.—7—
Secondly,portfolio behavior may also be plausibly related to anticipated
real yields, so that price expectations may affect choices with respect to
the composition of assets held and liabilities outstanding, wholly apart from
the respective totals)0 In a world of risk neutrality and zero transactions
costs, for example, a straightforward extension of the principle of Hicks (36]
and Lutz [44] is that lenders (investors) would presumably fully arbitrage
any difference in expected real holding-period yields among all nominal-interest
loans and all storable commodities. In practice, however, the available
opportunities for such portfolio substitutions involving consumption commodities
are usually extremely limited. Furthermore, while many investors can substitute
equities for fixed—return assets (money or loans) in their portfolios, recent
empirical and theoretical work has shown that equities are hardly an effective
"inflation hedge" in any short or intermediate run andhaseven cast doubt on
thelong-run relationship between equity returns and price inflation.11 Hence
simple propositions, framed as ifinvestors could actively arbitrage between
nominal interest bearing assets and the consumer—price-index basket of goods,
are inadequate for understanding the workings of the Fisher relation.
Nevertheless, even absolute barriers to portfolio substitution between
commodities and nominally denominated assets need not preclude investors'
portfolio behavior from having a key influence on the dynamics which connect
expected price inflation and nominal interest rates. As long as investors have
at least the choice between money (or, equivalently, short—term interest bearing
assets) and loans (of long duration), and as long as price inflation will
eventually affect some real variable, then investors' portfolio behavior can
still be the immediate vehicle by which expected price inflation affects
nominal yields. For example, investors expecting higher goods prices in the—8—
future will probably expect that the associated greater nominal volume of
transactions will increase the demand for money and therefore drive up nominal
interest rates (drive down loan prices) in the future. To avoid the resulting
capital losses on holding loans, such investors will act currently to substitute
money for loans in their portfolios, thereby causing a rise in nominal yields
(a fall in loan prices) to occur even while the anticipated higher goods prices
remain only an expectation rather than a reality.12 Similarly, investors
expecting price inflation may anticipate higher nominal interest rates to
follow, either because of the monetary authority's policy response to the
inflation or because of eventual induced changes in saving and investment
behavior. Once again, portfolio substitutions of money for loans, intended to
avoid capital losses, will cause an immediate rise in nominal yields)3
Hence el/en under the assumption of severely limited substitution possibili-
ties, which preclude investors' portfolio behavior from being the ultimate source
of the adjustment of nominal interest rates to price expectations, this behavior
may still substantially influence the dynamics of the adjustment process.
Especially since the changes in saving and investment behavior which may
ultimatelyunderlie the Fisher relationship presumably involve substantial
time lags, the role of portfolio behavior is a crucial determinant of whether
expectedreal yields reach their equilibrium (perhaps unaltered) levels
quickly or with a (perhaps exploitable) lag.
The specific object of attention in this paper is the role of lenders'
portfolio behavior in producing the adjustment of nominal interest rates to
expected price inflation. Sections II and III below develop and estimate
equations representing, with special attention to the influence of price
expectations, the maximizing behavior of lenders in the market which many—9—
previous researchers have also chosen to reflect mostclearlythe Fisher rela-
tionship —-inparticular, the market for long—term fixed-interest loans
(bonds). Section IV then uses a partial-equilibrium methodology to examine
the implications of lenders' portfolio behavior, asrepresented by these
equations, for the relationship between nominal interest rates andexpected
price inflation.—10—
II. A Model of Lenders' Demand for Loans
It is well known that, for risk averse investors maximizing the expected
utility of either terminal wealth or portfolio rate of return, the optimal port-
folio allocation depends not only on the means but also on the higher moments of
the distributions describing the expected holding-period rates of return on
each individual asset available for portfolio investment. Under the simplifying
assumption of joint normally (or lognormally) distributed rates of return,
therefore, optimal portfolio allocation depends on the means, variances and co-
variances of the individual expected asset yields)4 In the familiar linear homo-
geneous form, the resulting model of desired portfolio allocation is the expression15
= krk +1ik'kt + E ikjCkjt + i=l,...,N (1)
where
i=l,... ,N =theinvestor's desired holding of the i-th
asset at time period t (ZA =W)
=theinvestor's total portfolio size (wealth)
attime period t
erkl k=l,... ,N =theexpected value of the holding-period
yield on the k—th asset at time period t
Vkt? k=l,... ,N =thevariance associated with
c ,k,j=l,... ,N=thecovariance associated with re and kjt kt
and the 8ik' ik' 6ikj and it. are fixed coefficients which satisfy k =
'k =0for all k,ikj =0for all k andj, and Z it.=1.On the assump-
1 1 1
tion of universal substitutability, the andalsosatisfy 8•k > 0 >—11—
i =k,and 8ik <0<ik'
ik. The expression for the investor's desired







where the coefficients of the holding-periodyield expectations and variances
satisfy8>O>yand8<O<y kL.
What is the role of expected price inflationwithin a portfolio choice
framework like (1) and (2)? If real assetsconstitute a plausible asset for
portfolio investment, then the effect of priceexpectations here is striaght-
forward. The increase in goods prices is thensimply the holding-period
return on investment in such real assets, and theassociated expectation re is
an argument of (2). The associated coefficient is negative so that, for
all other things equal, greater expectationsof price inflation reduce lenders'
demand for loans. Following the discussion ofSection I, however, purchasing
the consumer—price—index basket of goods isnot in fact a practical portfolio
alternative.
For expected price inflation to influence lenders'portfolio behavior under
limited portfolio Substitution possibilities,therefore, inflation expectations
must differentially affect the expected holding—periodreturns (or variances or
covariances) on those assets which do constituteplausible portfolio choices.
For example, expected inflationmay increase the expected return to equities
relative to expected returns onmoney and loans (of all maturities) which have
fixed nominal yields. Alternatively, again inthe term—structure context,
investorsmayexpectthe future price inflation to bringhigher future nominal
interest rates, thereby increasing theexpected long—holding_period return or
a series of short-term loans relative to thatona long-term loan —-or,—12—
equivalently, to bring lower future loan prices, thereby reducing the expected
short—holding--period return on a long-term loan relative to that on a single
short—term loan)6 Even for an investor who cannot practically invest in real
assets, therefore, the demand—for—loans expression (2) may depend on expectations
of price inflation via their influence on the expected asset returns r. Moreover,
if the investor associates uncertainty of asset returns with uncertainty of
price inflation, then the variance (and relevant covariances) of price expecta-
tions will also be a determinant of the demand for loans.
The general portfolio allocation model (1), as well as the specific loan
demand expression (2), describes the determination of variables which are
unobservable in the presence of transactions costs. Consequently, it is
necessary to apply some model of portfolio adjustment to translate the implications
ofsuch expression into an operational model of behavior. The "optimal marginal
adjustment"model developed in Friedman (23]is useful for this purpose, in
thatit generalizes the familiar stock adjustment model so as to relate the
investor's short—run portfolio adjustments not only to the discrepancies
(Are -At...i),i=l,...,N, between the desired asset holdings from selection
model(1) and the corresponding previous-period holdings but also to the current
investable cash flow. The primary rationale for distinguishing the cash flow in
thiscontext is that current cash flows are typically more easily (costlessly)
allocated than are existing asset holdings. Since transactions costs constitute,
in the first instance, the underlying motivation for using a model which admits
discrepancies between actual and desired portfolio holdings,17 it is worth while
to model the implications of transactions costs with some care. The optimal
marginal adjustment model incorporates in a tractable form the differential
transactions costs between the investor's allocation of a new cash flow and—13—
re-allocation of existing asset holdings by positing the allocation of the
current cash flow according to whatever proportions portfolio selection model
(1) indicates are desired for the totalportfolio.
Givenaninvestor' s beginning-of—period wealth andcurrent—period cash






where the desired equilibrium proportions
F , i=l,...,N (Z ct =1) (4) it W 1 t 1.
follow from (1), and the 0ik are fixed coefficients of adjustmentsatisfying
0J.k =8for all k, with 0 arbitrary. Heuristically, the first termon the
right—hand side of (3) represents the re-allocation, according toa standard
multivariate stock—adjustment model, of the investor's existing assetholdings
i =l,...,N(which sum to the beginning-of—period wealthW_1), while
the secondterm represents the allocation of the investor' s current—period cash
flowaccording to the desired equilibrium proportionsa1, il,...N. The
key advantage of the optimal marginal adjustment model in the context of thispaper
is that it captures the greater sensitivity to expectedholding—period yields
(and inflation) of theallocationof the flow AWtincomparison with the re-
allocation ofthe stock W1.
Expandingportfolio adjustment model (3), using the desired loan demand
expression (2) as a specific component of portfolioselection model (1),














Here it is useful to distinguish the particular right-hand-side terms which do
and do not have coefficients of known sign a priori. Each expected holding-
period yield r and variance vkl k =1,...,N (including the own-yield r and
own-variancevL)enters (5) twice, in nonlinear form both times. In each case
the product of r or vk and the flow bears a coefficient which consists of
a single parameter of known sign from (1). Similarly, the lagged own-stock
L1 enters (5) with coefficient 0LI. <0from the stock—adjustment component
of (3). All other right—hand-side terms in (5) ——includingthe linear terms
W1 and as well as all nonlinear terms consisting of products
of r or vk with —-bearcoefficients which are of unknownsign apriori)8
Since the models of desired equilibrium portfolio behavior (1) and short—run
portfolio adjustment (3) underlying loan demand equation (5) deal with the
investor's demands for all assets (and supplies of all liabilities),
(5) is implicitly an element of a set of demand equations which satisfy the
various "adding-up" constraints specified above. By contrast, the more limited
focus of this paper is on the nature of investors' demands for loans -—more
specifically, long-term loans --andon the partial-equilibrium implications
of these demands for the relationship between expected price inflation and
nominalinterest rates. As Ladenson [37] and Smith (66] have shown, it is not—15-.
necessaryto use constrained estimation techniques to guarantee that the
parameter estimates of the full set of demand equations satisfy the "adding-up"
constraints,so thatthere is no inconsistency involved in estimating only one
demandequation rather than the entire set. In principle, however, even for
the limited objective at hand, a complete model including all assets (and
liabilities too) would be preferable. In particular, a complete model would
not only facilitate a general—equilibrium analysis but also permit the researcher
to adopt the philosophy as well as the mechanics of Brainard arid Tobin (6] by
examining the implications for other asset demand equations of the presence of
a given variable in any one asset demand equation. The construction of such a
complete model, however, lies well beyond the scope of this paper.
Section III presents the results of estimating loan demand equation (5)
applied to the demand for long-term fixed-interest loans by six separate
categories of U.S. lenders.-16—
III. Estimation Results
Preliminary Issues. it is useful at the outset to comment briefly on
several aspects of the specification and estimation of the loan demandequa-
tions presented below.
Disaggregation: The equations presented below represent the demand for
long-term loans to private borrowers (that is, long-termcorporate bonds) by
six categories of U.S. lenders which together heldapproximately 93% of all
such loans outstanding in the United States as of yearend 1976: life insurance
companies (34.4%), other insurance companies (4.0%), private pension funds(11.0%),
state and local government retirement funds (19.3%), mutualsavings banks (5.7%),
and households'9 (18.4%). This disaggregation is useful because suchdiverse
lenders —-which face different legislative andregulatory constraints, and play
different roles in the markets' highly complex intermediation structure——are
unlikely to exhibit identical portfolio responses to expected price inflation.
For example, although life insurance companies must earn realdividends, since
their liabilities are almost exclusively in nominal form it is not obviousthat
their asset demands are highly sensitive to expected real yields in theshort run.
In addition, life insurance companies in most states can investonly a small
fraction of their portfolios in equities. By contrast,many pension funds face
liabilities which are either explicitly or implicitly indexed toconsumer goods
prices, and private pension funds in particular have substantiallymore latitude
in allocating their portfolios.
Data: The primary data source for the stock and flowquantities used to
estimate these equations is the Federal Reserve System's flow—of—fundsaccounts
[1, and subsequent issues].2° These data are seasonallyadjusted and are
denominated in millions of dollars. The sample period consists of56 quarterly
observations beginning in 1960:1 and ending in l973:IV.—17—
Theparticular nominal interest rate rL used in these equations is the
observed new-issue yield on long-term bonds issued by utility companies rated
Aa by Moody's Investors Ser,ice, Inc. Aa-rated utility bonds provide the
greatest continuity, in terms of the frequency of new issues; they are also
most representative of new-issue activity in the U.S. market. Previous studies
oflong—term nominal interest ratedetermination using thereduced—form
term—structureapproach haverelied on indices of yields either on new issues
orseasoned issues,but the new—issue yield is likely to be superior for
severalreasons. First, trading inthe corporate bond market involves either
newissues orrecent issues to a far greater extent thanseasoned issues, and
quotedprice movements among seasoned issues are often just a reflection of
what is happening in the new-issue market. Secondly, because of thin trading
markets, problems of measurement are considerably smaller for new issues than
forseasoned issues. Thirdly, differences in coupon rates between current new
issues and the issues used in constructing seasoned yield indices introduce a
form of bias into the seasoned yield index itself.
Instrumentalvariables estimation: Since the own—yield onlong-term loans
is jointly determined by lenders' demands for loans and borrowers' supplies of
loans, it is necessary to allow for this simultaneity in deriving consistent
estimates of the loan demand equations. The relevant set of instruments used
here for deriving consistent estimators includes not only the exogenous vari-
ables in the six respective disaggregated demand equations but also the
exogenous variables in the two disaggregated loan supply equations developed in
Friedman(22]. As istypically the case in multi-equation models, it is impos-
sible to apply the two-stage least-squares method directly because there are
toomany exogenousvariables to permitordinaryleast—squares estimation of
the system's reduced form as this method requires.Theprocedure used here—18—
follows Brundy and Jorgenson [5] in using as instrumental variables not only
the leading principal components of the full—system set of exogenous variables
but also, on an equation—by—equation basis, the single-equation sets of
exogenous variables themselves.
Intercepts: Equation (5) has no intercept term, but it is probably accurate
to consider the portfolio behavior model developed in Section II as a linear
approximation to a more complex behavioral pattern, and an intercept may follow
from linearization. The procedure used here includes or excludes an intercept
in each loan demand equation according to the t-statistic.
Expectations proxies: Since lenders' expectations are unobservable, both
for price inflation and for nominal holding-period returns on assets subject to
capital gains or losses, it is necessary to use some indirect representation in
their place. Nevertheless, no sharp consensus exists on the best form of
expectations proxy to use for such purposes. The approach adopted here, there-
fore, is to estimate each of the six loan demand equations twice —-onceusing
an autoregressive and once using a rational representation of lenders'
expectations.
Results Based on Autoregressive Expectations. A familiar representation
of expectations, used by many of the researchers who have explored the rela-
tionship between expected price inflation and nominal interest rates, is that
market participants form their expectations of relevant variables on the basis
of previously observed values of these variables. Following Nerlove [53], a





where E(.) is the expectation held at time t, the w. are lag weights and the—19—
tilde indicates that variablex1 is unknown as of time t, is consistent
with the optimal linear prediction of a time series from its own past history.
Several familiar simple expectations mechanisms, such as the "naive" model that
next period will be like last period, or Cagan's (6] adaptiveexpectation, are
special cases of autoregressive expectations. More generally, Modigliani and
Shiller (48] have usefully illustrated, also in the context of interest rate and
price expectations, that autoregressive expectations are consistent with a
combination of extrapolative and regressive components. To emphasize the
contrast to the more restrictive adaptive schemes, some writers have referred
to such general autoregressive expectations mechanisms as "partly rational" or
"weak—form rational."21
Table 1 shows the results of estimating loan demand equation (5), for
each of the six categories of lenders indicated above, using autoregressive
representationsof the relevant expectations. The variable symbols are con-
sistent for all six equations, with letter superscripts indicating distinctions
amongcorresponding variables for the respective categories of lenders.
Asterisk superscripts indicate terms for which an equation is estimatedusing
fitted values of the variable from the first stage of the instrumental vari-
ablesprocedure.22 The numbers in parenthesesare ratios of estimated
coefficients to the corresponding standard errors.23
Following the autoregressive model, these equations use distributed lags
on past percentagechangesof the consumer price index, past percentage changes
in the one-period loan yield, andpastpercentage changes in equity prices to
represent the influence of these past observations on lenders' expected
holding-periodyields. Similarly, these equations use computedmoving-average
variancesto represent the second moments of the distributions describingTable 1
LOAN DEMAND EQUATIONS BASED ON AUTOREGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS
Life Insurance Companies
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Private Pension Funds
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State-Local Retirement Funds
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Mutual Savings Banks
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Summaryof Variable Symbols
C =holdingsof commercial mortgages
E=holdingsof corporate equities
I=holdingsof intermediate-term U.S. government securities
L =holdingsof long-term corporate bonds
M =holdingsof municipal bonds
R =holdingsof residential mortgages
U =holdingsof all U.S. government securities




















new commercial mortgages (ALIAseries)
equities(S&P dividend/price ratio)
intermediate-termU.S. government securities (3—5 years)
corporate bonds (new Aa utility issues)
municipal bonds (new Aaaissues)
commercial paper (prime 4—6 months)
Treasury bills (3 months)
of yield on long—term U.S. government securities
of yield on equities (dividend/price yield only)
of yield on equities (total return)
of yield on corporate bonds
of rate of price inflation (CPI)
= annualizedpercentage change of consumer price index
Q=annualizedpercentage change of equity prices (S&P)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are ratios of estimated values to standard errors.
SE in millions of dollars.—20—
lenders'expectations. The distributed lags on consumerprices andone—period
loanyieldsare estimated, within the estimation of the loan demandequations,
with lag weights constrained to follow athird-degree polynomial pattern, the
right-hand tail of the lag constrained topass through zero, and the lead lag
weight free of the polynomial constraint.24 Thecoefficients shown in Table 1
for the several distributed lag variablesare in each case the sums of the
estimated lag weights. The equity price distributedlags and the moving-average
variances, by contrast, rely on uniform fixed weights.
The results shown in Table 1 are broadly consistentwith the model of
portfolio behavior developed in Section II. The estimatedequations explain
a large percentage of the variation of the changes ofholdings (net purchases)
of long—term loans by all lender categories otherthan private pension funds.
The demand for loans in each case respondspositively to the currently prevail-
ing nominal yield on long-term fixed-interest loans;negatively to currently
prevailing nominal yields on competing assets; negatively to theexpected yield
on a series of one—period loans, as representedby the distributed lag on past
one-period loan yields; and negatively to expected priceinflation, as repre-
sented by the distributed lag on past price movements.Some lenders' loan
demands also respond negatively to theexpected capital gain on equities, as
represented by the distributed lag on past equity pricemovements. The dif-
ferent moving—average variances appear in theseequations in an irregular way;
butthe own—variance (calculated from realized netreturns to holding corporate
bonds) and the price variance enter negatively in eachcase, while the variances
of competing asset yields enter positively in each case.25
Table 2 summarizes, for all six categories oflenders, three key coeffi-
cients of the loan demand equation whichare particularly relevant for assessingTable 2
SELECTED PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR LOAM DEMAND
EQUATIONS BASEDON AUTOREGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS
Lender Category LL LP 0LL RNSE
Life Insurance Companies .219 —.322 .355 125
(2.9) (—2.8) (5.6)
Other Insurance Companies .050 — .253 33
(6.2) (2.4)
Private Pension Funds .100 —.098 .463 164
(3.1) (—1.8) (2.5)
State-Local Retirement Funds .077 —.123 .267 77
(2.0) (—2.4) (2.8)
Mutual Savings Banks .377 —.079 .272 84
(6.0) (—1.5) (7.0)
Households .070 —.033 .284 323
(5.1) (—2.3) (4.0)
Notes: Nunibers in parentheses are ratios of estimated values to standard errors.
RMSE in millions of dollars.—21—
therole of lenders' portfolio behavior in therelationship between expected
price inflation and nominal interest rates.
First, the estimated own—yield coefficients
B, from the specific loan
equation (2) of the desired portfolio selection
xxdel (1), indicate the
responsiveness of the desired fraction of loansin the portfolio. With the
exception of mutual savinqs banks (for which
is implausibly large), these
estimates are all of credible magnitude in
addition to being significantly
greater than zero at high confidence levels. In eachcase the value of
indicates the fractional increase in the share ofthe portfolio which the
lender will want to allocate to long-term fixed-interestloans if, with all
other things equal, the nominal own—yieldon loans rises by one percentage
point (that is, by 100 basis points).
Secondly, the estimated price expectations coefficients8,, again from
(2), indicate the responsiveness to expected inflationof the desired fraction
of loans in the portfolio. These estimatesare significantlydifferentfrom
zero, with the expected negative sign, for five of the sixcategories of
lenders.26 Hence thegreater the expected inflation as inferred from recent
observed inflation --allother things, including the nominal loan interest
rate, equal ——thesmaller are these lenders' demands for fixed—interestloans.
Following the discussion in Section II, thisresponse may represent an
explicit utility maximization of real rather than nominalwealth (or rate of
return), or itmay indicatethat investors draw inferences about future interest
ratemovements (about future capital gains) from observationsof price infla-
tion. The magnitudes of theestimates provide support for the hypothesis
that lenders seek to maximize the utilityof some real quantity since, for
fourof thesix lender groups, it is impossible toreject at the 10%confidence—22—
level the hypothesis = Nevertheless, since the estimated lag weight
sums reported here are not identifiable as estimates without an arbitrary
(though plausible) assumption that the true lag weights in the autoregressive
expectation sum to unity,27 it is not in general appropriate to assign these
estimates a specific economic interpretation strictly comparable to the
corresponding .Theseestimates reflect the effect of observed price infla-
tion on the demand for loans, including not only the effect of expected inflation
on portfolio behavior but also the effect of observed inflation on expected
• . 28
inflation.
Thirdly, the 0LL estimates reflect the stock-adjustment component of the
optimal marginal adjustment model (3). These estimates are significantly
different from zero, with the expected positive sign, for all six categories
of lenders. Their magnitudes roughly correspond to intuitive judgments of
various lenders' respective likely speeds of portfolio adjustment based on
institutional considerations; private pension funds, for example, which are
typically managed very actively, undertake the most rapid re-allocation of
their existing assets.29 Although these estimated adjustment speeds are fairly
rapid in comparison to those typically found by previous researchers, they
still indicate the existence of lags in portfolio behavior which will, in the
short run, prevent nominal yields from immediately achieving their full
adjustment to any stimulus affecting lenders' behavior --includingexpected
price inflation.
In addition, for purposes of comparison with the alternative set of loan
demandequations estimated using the rational representation of the relevant
unobservable expectations,Table 2 shows the root—mean—square forecast error
for each of the six equations.
30—23—
Results Based on Rational Expectations. Recent researchershave broadly
applied Muth's [52] concept of rational expectations,especially in the con-
text of models dealing with the effectiveness ofmonetary policy.31 Expecta-




where Et(.) is again the expectation conditionalon all information available
as of time t, and u is a zero—mean finite—variance random disturbance which is
serially uncorrelated as well as uncorrelated withEt(.). In other words,
expectations are rational in Muth's sense if the lender'sexpectation equals
themathematical expectation of the corresponding variable,conditional on all
information available as of time t.32As Frenkel[21] andMussa[51] among
othershave shown in the specific context of price inflation, ifthe nature
of the process generating realizations of thex series is such that all
relevant information is contained in past values ofx itself, then the auto-
regressive expectation is also the rational expectation. Nevertheless, even
in simple models the necessary conditions for rationaland autoregressive
expectations to be identical are typically severe, so that it isuseful to
treat these two representations of expectationsas distinct alternatives for
estimation purposes.
As McCallum [46] and others have emphasized, in the absenceof perfect
foresight Muth's definition of rationality renders the realizationx+1 in
(7) distributed around, rather than equal to, the
expectation Et (x+1),
therebyleading to a classical errors—in—variables problem for estimation if
actual values are simply used in place of the relevantexpectations. The
procedure used here to estimate loan demand equation (5) underrational
expectations therefore replaces theactualvalues corresponding to the three—24—
relevant expectations -—ofprice inflation, capital gains on bonds, and
capital gains on equities —-withtheir respective Brundy-Jorgenson instrumented
values. While any valid instrument will givea consistent estimate of the
coefficient of such an expectation, this instrument willgive a more efficient
estimate than the commonly suggested simpler one basedonly on past realizations
of the series themselves if lenders, in forming theirexpectations, take account
of the additional information on which the instrumentis based.33 In the
absence of any clear interpretation of therationality definition •for higher
moments of distributions, the variance representations included inthese equations
are the same moving—average variances used in the equationspresented above
based on autoregressive expectations.
Table 3 shows the estimates and standard error ratiosfor two coefficients
of the loan demand equations based on rationalexpectations. The estimated
coefficients again indicate the responsiveness, to the (rational)expecta-
tion of price inflation, of the desired fraction ofloans in the portfolio.
The estimated coefficients8LC analogously indicate the responsiveness of
desired portfolio allocation to the (rational)expectation of capital gains
on bonds. In sharp contrast to the corresponding estimates shown inTables 1
and 2 for the loan demand equations based onautoregressive expectations,
these coefficient estimates are significantly different fromzero, with the
expected signs (negative for 8, positive for8) for only two and zero
categories of lenders, respectively.
Table 3 also shows the root-mean—square forecasterrors for each of
the six loan demand equations estimated using the rationalexpectations pro-
cedure. In each of the six cases, this error isgreater than the error shown
in Table 2 for the corresponding loan demandequation based on autoregressive
expectations. These root-mean-square errors are essentialto a valid comparisonTable 3
SELECTED PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR LOAN DEMAND
EQUATIONS BASEDON RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
LenderCategory 8LP 8LC RMSE
LifeInsurance Companies —.0471 .000437 221
(—1.1) (0.3)
OtherInsurance Companies .0517 —.00278 129
(1.0) (—1.2)'
PrivatePension Funds .0215 .0000375 190
(1.2) (0.0)
State—Local Retirement Funds .00740 —.00247 98
(0.4) (—2.0)
Mutual Savings Banks —.0369 —.00339 100
(—3.6) (—3.3)
Households —.0292 —.0000555 437
(—4.3) (—0.1)
Notes:Numbers in parentheses are ratios of estimated values to standard errors.
RMSE inmillions of dollars.—25—
of the two sets of results, since high multicollinearity between the price
inflation and capital gain series (as would be expected under perfect arbitrage)
could in principle explain the weakness of the and 8LC estimates. By
contrast, the respective root—mean—square errors are not sensitive to multi—
collinearity, and their comparison --whichuniformly favors the equations
based on the autoregressive expectations proxies —-isanalogous to an F-test
rather than the t-tests reported for the individual parameter estimates.
Section Iv presents a partial-equilibrium analysis of the role of lenders'
portfolio behavior in the relationship between expected price inflation and
nominal interest rates, based on the autoregressive expectations version of
the loan demand equations shown in full in Table 1.—26--
IV.Expected Price Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates
Theequations developed andestimatedin Section III represent lenders'
demand for loans. These six equations,together with some representation of
borrowers' supply of loans, therefore constitutea complete model of the loan




where L is the supply of loans,thereb4y enables the model to determine the
nominal loan yieldwhich is an argumentof each of the six estimated loan
demand equations.34Furthermore, since five of these six equations explicitly
includeexpected price inflation as another independent variable, the nominal
loanyield determined inthis model isan implicitfunction ofexpected
inflation.
Figure 1 illustrates in (rL L)space how a partial-equilibrium analysis
basedon the six estimated loan demand equations and equilibrium condition(8),
with loan supply taken as given, isolates the contributionof lenders' portfolio
behaviorto the
relationship.
The object of this analysis is to show how the nominal loanyield would respond
to expected inflation if all aspects of economic behavior otherthan lenders'
portfolio behavior remained unchanged. In particular, theassumption of given
investablecash flows (which are important arguments of theloan demand equations)
holdsunchangedall decisions about how much to save, and theassumption of a
given loan supply analogously holds unchanged notonly all decisions about how
much to invest but also borrowers' decisions withrespect to the composition of
their liabilities.
In Figure1the upward sloping curve L(Pe), whichrepresents the aggregatedJ .L
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demandfor loans conditional on some fixed expectation ofprice inflation
intersects the fixed loan supply L at interest raterL. CurveL(Pe +1%),
which represents the demand for loans conditionalon an inflation expectation
1% greater, is shifted to the left from L(e),indicating lenders' reduced
willingness to hold bonds at anygivennominal interest rate. Curve L(Pe +1%)
thereforeintersects L at interest raterL > andthe difference (r rL) --
thatis, the "upward shift" measured by the vertical distance between L(Pe+1%)
and L(Pe) for a given L —-indicatesthe increase inrL which makes lenders
content to hold exactly L loans after an increase of 1% in theirexpectation
of price inflation.
Figure2 and Table 4 summarize the results of a dynamic version ofsuch
a partial-equilibrium analysis based on the six estimated loan demandfunctions
from SectionIII, the market equilibrium condition (8), and given loan supply.
The heavy solid line in Figure 2 plots the observed historicalvalues of the
nominal loan yield which, as Table 4 shows, averaged 6.07%over the 1960-73
sample period. The light solid line in the figure plots the simulatedvalues
of the nominal loan yield from the nxdel of lenders'portfolio behavior. This
"control" simulation, based on historical values of allexogenous variables
(including distributed lags on observed price inflation inplace of the unobservable
inflation expectation), is fully dynamic in that, after thefirst quarter of
thesimulation, the solution uses internally generated values for thelagged
own-stock variables in each of the six loan demand equations.
This control simulation indicates that thepartial—equilibrium loan market
model reproduces the relevant historical experience withreasonable accuracy.
There is no significant bias for anyofthe model's seven jointly determined
variables,and, as Table 4shows, themeansimulated value of the nominal loanT ____ • --LJ'-
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NOMINALLOAN YIELD DYNAMICSIMULATIONS
1960—73 Difference
Average Yield from Historical
Historical 6.07 %
Control Simulation 6.07 0.00 %
1 % Greater Inflation Experiment 6.72 0.65—28—
yield is precisely 6.07%. For the six loan demand variables, the root—mean-
square dynamic simulation errors are about in line with those shown in Table 2,
indicating that the errors made by individual equations have no observable
tendency to compound one another.35 For the nominal loan yield, the root-mean-
square dynamic simulation error is 0.21% (that is, 21 basis points) --about
comparable to the "fit" achieved by previous researchers who have directly
estimated reduced-form equations for long-term nominal interest rates.36
This within—sample performance seems quite creditable, especially since the
methodology of the structural model does not estimate an equation directly for
this yield but, instead, implies an equation for the yield which is restricted
by the underlying structural hypotheses about lenders' portfolio behavior.37
What equilibrium adjustment in the nominal interest rate, equivalent to
the difference between r and rL In Figure 1, will lenders' portfolio behavior
induce in response to greater expectations of price inflation? The broken line
in Figure 2 plots the simulated values of the nominal loan yield from an
alternative simulation which differs from the control only in that the expected
rate of price inflation is 1% greater throughout the simulation period. Specifi-
cally, this simulation experiment is based on values of the rate of change of
consumer prices which, from as long before 1960 as is consistent with the
distributed-lag price expectations terms in the estimated loan demand equations,
are 1% greater than the corresponding historical values. In all other respects
this simulation is identical to the control.
Since the demand for loans by five categories of lenders responds negatively
to the greater expectations of price inflation,38 the nominal loan yield must
rise as in Figure 1 if total loan demand is still to equal total loan supply.
As the broken line in Figure 2 shows, the market—clearing level of the nominal—29—
yield in this experiment is strictly greater thanthecontrol simulation
level throughout the simulation period. The mean simulated value of the
nominal yield in this experiment (r) as Table 4 shows, is 6.72% —-an
increase of 0.65% above the control simulation mean (rL).
Finally, what is the dynamicspeedby which lenders' portfolio behavior will
bringabout this 0.65% equilibrium adjustment? The dotted line in Figure 2 plots
the simulated values of the nominal loan yield from a further experiment in
whichthe 1% increase in the assumed rate of price inflation, .incomparison
with the control, is effective only in l966:Iv and thereafter. Hence this
experimnt's results for 1960—66 are identical to those of the control simula-
tion. As of 1967:1, however, the simulated nominal loan yieldbegins to rise
abovethecontrol path. By 1971:1 —-thatis, after four years --the
adjustmentto the new equilibriumpath,which is identical to that of the
first simulation experiment, is essentially complete.
These simple partial-equilibrium experiments cannot, ofcourse, represent
the complete nature of the
relationship. In the first instance, the intent motivating their construction
is not to model all of the underlying economic behavior but ratherto isolate
the role of lenders' portfolio behavior. Borrowers' portfolio behavior, for
example, presumably corresponds to a downward sloping loan supply curve instead
of the vertical Lin Figure 1, and theequilibrium adjustment of the interest
ratewill,be greater (less) than 0.65% if the "upward shift" of the supply
curve is greater (less) thanthe0.65% found here for the aggregated demand
curve.40 This analysis also abstractsfrom the influences of saving and
investmentbehavior as discussed in Section I. In addition, as the discussion
of Section II notes, even the lenders' portfolio behavior modeled here applies—30—
only to one market ——thatfor long—term fixed-interest loans --ratherthan
to the complete set of all asset and liability markets. Nevertheless, these
partial—equilibriumexperiments are instructive in showing that lenders'
portfolio behavior is an important part of the Fisher relationship, that this
behavior alone is likely to yield a large (but less thanone-for—one)equilibrium
adjustment of nominal interest rates to expected price inflation, and that the
dynamic path toward the equilibrium adjustment involves a substantial time lag.—31—
V. Suimnary of Conclusions
Both the equilibrium extent and the dynamic path of the adjustment of
nominal interest rates to expected price inflation are important questions
for monetary theory and policy. The role of portfolio behavior is especially
interesting in this context because, of the different kinds of economic
behavior which may underlie the Fisher relationship, it is the most plausibly
flexible in the short run. Even so, since substitution into real assets is
not a practical portfolio alternative for many investors, it is not obvious
a priori how important lenders' portfolio behavior is in this relationship.
The empirical results presented in this paper indicate that lenders'
portfolio behavior does play an important role in the expected-price-inflation/
nominal—interest—rate relationship.
First, at the single—equation level, the results provide evidence that,
with all other things equal, five of the six major categories of lenders in
the U.S. long—term fixed—interest loan market reduce their demands for loans
in response to an increase in expected inflation. Even life insurance com-
panies, whose liabilities are almost entirely in nominal form, respond to
price expectations in this way.
Secondly, at the multi—equation partial—equilibrium level, the results
indicate that, with all other things equal, this response by lenders will
raise the equilibrium nominal loan yield by 0.65% in response to a 1% increase
in expected inflation. The results also indicate that this 0.65% adjustment
requires approximately four years for completion.Footnotes
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1. See especially Fisher [17], [18, ch. 5] and[19, h. 19]; emphasis added.
2. Prominent examples include Cargill [8], Fama[12], Feldstein and Chamberlain
[14], Feldstejn and Eckstejn [15], Gibson [31, 32], Lahiri[38], Modigliani
and Shiller [48], Pesando [54], Pyle [55],Sargent [60,62], and Yohe and
Karnosky [72].
3. See Fisher [19, pp. 438-442]. Somewhatastonishingly to the modern reader,
Fisher's suggested "interpretation" followed Wicksefl[71] in noting that
higher prices usually meant a greater nominal volume oftrade, which in
turn increased the demand formoney, and hence increased nominal interest
ratesfor given bank reserves. What is surprising about this"interpretation" isthat, as rendered by Fisher, it hasnothing whatever to do with expecta- tions.In addition, the association of higher prices witha greater nominal
transactions volume is necessarily valid only if thesource of the infla-
tion is a demand shock to theeconomy; under a supply shock prices rise
but real transactions volume falls,so that the change in nominal trans-
actions volume remains ambiguous in general.
4. See Friedman (26] for an analogous treatment ofthe role of borrowers'
portfolio behavior.
5. On invariance of the real rate withrespect to inflation [19, p. 493]:
"...in actual practice.. .the appreciationor depreciation of the monetary
standard does produce a real effect on the rate of interest...This effect, intimes of great changes in the purchasingpower of money, is by far the greatest of all effects on the rate of interest." Onconstancyof the real rate for given inflation [19, p. 411]: "...thereare...so many other causes affecting the rate of interest besides changesin the price level."
Theseviews clearly contradict such interpretationsas the "Fisherian"
proposition tested in Faina[12].
6.See Fisher (17, pp. 75-78] and the useful discussion inRutledge (56].
7. See again the references cited in footnote 2.Froyen and Davidson (30]
argued (along the lines takenbelow) infavor of a structural modelling
approach, but their empirical work also relied on a reduced-form model.
8. See Sargent [63] for a forcefulstatement of this point.
9.The conceptof the nominal yield's being "proximatelydetermined"in the loan market is not inconsistentwith the principle of general equilibrium
in the asset markets (see, for example, Tobin[70])or for the economy as
a whole (see, for example, Grossman [34]). In welldeveloped financialmarkets, of course, the relevant group of "lenders" include not only those
who make primary loans directly to borrowers but also those who may under
certain circumstances be willing to acquire debt securities in a secondary
market.
10. In simple consumption—loan models there is typically no meaningful dis-
tinction between saving behavior and portfolio behavior in the conventional
sense as meant here; see, for example, Samuelson (58]. It is also worth
noting that, even in models in which the two kinds of behavior have distinct
meanings, they are not in general independent; see, for example, Fama (11],
Merton [47], and Samuelson (59]. Hence the portfolio behavior analyzed
in Section II below implicitly relies on a single-period horizon.
11. See, for example, Bodie (2], Cagan [7], and Lintner [40].
12. This argument is parallel to that of Fisher and Wicksell, but it differs
in that it involves expectations in a fundamental way; see again footnote 3.
13. While capital loss avoiding behavior as in these two examples clearly
indicates a connection between expected price inflation and long-term
interest rates, this argument does not carry over to short—term interest
rates. Hence it may be more accurate to refer to such effects as "term-
structure effects" rather than "Fisher effects," but it is difficult to
support any such sharp distinction on the basis of Fisher's own work; see
again footnote 12.
14. See Lintner (39,41],for example, for theprecisederivation of asset
demandfunctions from maximization of a negative exponential (or logarithmic)
utility function under the normality (or lognormality) assumption. Alterna-
tively, asTobin (68] and Markowitz (45] have shown, the first and second
moments of the yield distributions are sufficient to determine asset demands,
regardless of the distribution assumed, if utility is quadratic.
15. See Friedman [25] for a review of the alternative sets of assumptions which
permit the derivation of asset demand functions that satisfy the homogeneity
property and that are linear in expected asset yields; de Leeuw [10] and
M. Friedman (29] also provided discussions of the rationale behind the
homogeneity constraint. Asset demand functions of this form are familiar
in both empirical (e.g.,de Leeuw) and abstract (e.g., Brainard and Tobin [41)
workon portfolio behavior in monetary economics. A particular advantage
of the homogenous form, in the context of this paper's concern with price
inflation, is that rising dollar magnitudes per se do not affect the
portfolioallocation.
16.See Stiglitz (67] for a demonstration that these two propositions are
equivalent. Modigliani and Shiller (48] provided a useful discussion of the
role of price expectations in differentially influencing the expected
holding yields on short- versus long-term bonds.
17. See Foley [20] for a useful analysis of this issue.18. See Friedman [23]. It is worth noting explicitly that the nonlinear way
in which the flow matters for short-run portfolio behavior in the optimal
marginal adjustment model is in sharp contrast to the work of Bosworth and
Duesenberry [3] and Henderghott and Lemon [35] who, without explicitly
developing an underlying model of portfolio adjustment, emphasized linear
dependence on the cash flow.
19. The household sector as defined here primarily consists of individuals but
also includes non-profit organizations and bank—managed personal trusts.
20. See Friedman [23] for further details on precise definitions of variables,
in particular the cash flows of life insurance companies and households
and dummy variables in the two insurance company equations.
21. See, for example, Sargent [64], Rutledge [56] and McCallum[46].
22. Because of the nonlinear way in which both expected yields and variances
enter the model, as indicated in (5), all such terms are products. The
correct instrument to use in each such case, for purposes of deriving
consistent estimators, is the first—stage fitted value of the entire
product; this procedure is used here.
23. Becauseof the instrumental variables estimation procedure, the standard error ratiosshown are asymptotically distributed as t-statistics but are
not necessarily distributed as t—statistics in small samples.
24.The estimation ofthese distributed lags presents an interesting identifi-
cation problem due to thepotential appearance of eachdistributed lag in
two separate nonlinear terms on the right-hand side of each single loan
demand equation.See Friedman and Roley [27]for thederivation of the
method used to solve the resulting estimation problem.
25. See Friedman [23] andFriedmanandRoley[28] for further detailsof the
exactprocedures used in deriving the equations' final specifications.
Itis interesting that the standard error ratios of the variance terms
are uniformly smaller (in absolute value) in these equations than in the
corresponding ordinary—least—squares estimates.
26. This coefficient was insignificant in the loan demand equation for non-
life insurance companies, andsothe CE t.Pt j).wtermis omitted from
the final specification. Thatequation includes the price expectations
distributed lag in the term CEt
.Pt but,as the discussion of
(5) in Section II indicates, the coefficient of this term is a sumof
products of parameters in the underlying model consisting of (1)and (3).
Thestandarderror ratio for the coefficient of the CE C.P .)tW term it—i t
in the equation for mutual savings banks issmall, but the F-test indicates
that this lag structure is significant at the 5% confidence level.27. The unit sum constraint implies that lenders believe that the stochastic
process generating the price inflation is borderline stationary/nonsta—
tionary --thatis, any rate of inflation which has persisted for a long
time will continue to persist. U.S. survey evidence suggests that inflation
expectations in the 1970s do differ from those of the 1950s and 1960s in
such a way as to render this borderline stationary/nonstationary specifica-
tion plausible. Alternatively, for the process to be stationary, the lag
weights in the estimated equations would have to sum to less than unity,
and the expectation would also have to include a constant term. Several
other writers have also emphasized this point; see, for example, Lucas
[42] and Sargent [61].
28. Another reason for caution in interpreting the estimates is the
potential difficulty of distinguishing first— from second—moment effects.
Gordon and Halpern [33], for example, have argued that the mean of the
inflation rate is a good proxy for the associated uncertainty; such an
effect here would bias upward the absolute values of the estimates.
In addition, the estimated equations for the two categories of taxable
investors do not allow for specific tax effects, which have shifted during
the sample period; see, for example, Feldstein and Summers [16].
29. This interpretation of the 0.. estimates is merely heuristic, however,
since in a multivariate stock-adjustment model the "speed of adjustment"
depends on the eigenvalues of the entire matrix of 0. .coefficients,not
just the on-diagonal 0.. values.
12.
30. For equations estimated by an instrumental variables procedure, the root-
mean-square forecast error (computed from the actual values of all right-
hand-side variables) is a better measure of statistical performance than
is the estimated standard error (computed from instrumented values of the
right-hand—side variables).
31. See, for example, Lucas [43] and Sargent and Wallace [65].
32. It is worth pointing out that the information available as of time t must
include, to within a set of additive white noise disturbances, knowledge
of the model which will generate the actual outcome x+i; hence this
definition of rationality is stronger than the usual notion of using
efficiently all available information. For further discussion of the
informational implications of assuming rationality in this sense, see
Friedman [24].
33. Fully efficient estimates, of course, would require instruments based
on the model which lenders actually used to form their expectations.
34. Since the six categories of lenders whose portfolio behavior is explicitly
represented in the estimated loan demand equations do not hold all of the
outstanding loans, L is more precisely the supply of loans minus those
loans held by other lenders.35. The RMSE values for the six lender categories, in their order of
appearance in Table 2, are 120, 36, 176, 87, 114 and 247, respectively.
36. Modigliani and Shiner's [48] preferred equation had SE= 0.13% for the
less volatile Aaa yield over the sample period 1955:1114971:II. Re-
estimating the Modigliani-shjller equation using the Aa yield and the
1960:I—1973:IV sample period leads to an equatior with SE =0.22%but
with the coefficients of the distributed lag on the short-termyield
not significantly different from zero. Feldstein and Eckstein's [15]
preferred equation had SE =0.09%for the Aaa yield over the sample
period 1954:1—1969:11. Re—estimating the Feldstein—Eckstejn equation
using the Aa yield and the l960:I-l973:Iv sample period leads to an equa-
tion with SE =0.29%.Feldstein and Chamberlain's [14] preferred equation
had SE =0.21% for the Aaa yield over the sample period 1954:1-1971:1.
37. This point is especially relevant to the presence of other long—term
yields in the estimated loan demand equations for several categories of
lenders. Including other long-term yields as independent variables in
an unrestricted equation with the bond yield as dependent variable would
presumably increase greatly such an equation's fit. In the context of
the structural model, however, the contribution of other long—term yields
is restricted to their role in influencing the net purchases variables.
See Friedman [23] for a discussion of the structural modeling methodology
as specifically applied to the determination of long—term interest rates.
38. Since the Pt).w1 terms whichappear in the loan demand equations
for three categories of lenders reflect these lenders' behavior in other
markets, the solution used the historical P values for these variables
and introduced the 1% increase only in the (E terms. See
again footnote 24. 1
39.An alternative to taking means over simulated values is simply to solve
the model using the sample-period means of theexogenous variables. This
reverse strategy yields an estimate of 0.70% instead of 0.65%. The
difference is due to the model's nonlinearity.
40. The analogous experiments in Friedman (26] indicate that the loansupply
curve actually "shifts upward" by slightly less than 0.65% for an additional
1% of expected price inflation, so that the net upward adjustment of the
interest rate is slightly less than that indicated by theanalysis of- lenders'behavior alone, and the resulting quantity L is slightly below L.References
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